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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of distributed classi-
fication with a network of heterogeneous agents. The agents seek
to jointly identify the underlying target class that best describes
a sequence of observations. The problem is first abstracted
to a hypothesis-testing framework, where we assume that the
agents seek to agree on the hypothesis (target class) that best
matches the distribution of observations. Non-Bayesian social
learning theory provides a framework that solves this problem
in an efficient manner by allowing the agents to sequentially
communicate and update their beliefs for each hypothesis over
the network. Most existing approaches assume that agents have
access to exact statistical models for each hypothesis. However, in
many practical applications, agents learn the likelihood models
based on limited data, which induces uncertainty in the likelihood
function parameters. In this work, we build upon the concept of
uncertain models to incorporate the agents’ uncertainty in the
likelihoods by identifying a broad set of parametric distribution
that allows the agents’ beliefs to converge to the same result
as a centralized approach. Furthermore, we empirically explore
extensions to non-parametric models to provide a generalized
framework of uncertain models in non-Bayesian social learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-Bayesian social learning provides a scalable approach
for distributed inference of boundedly rational agents with het-
erogeneous sensing modalities interacting over a network [1].
In this setting, agents receive a stream of partial observations
conditioned on true state of the world. Each agent uses its
private observations and network communications to construct
a set of beliefs on a finite set of possible states of the world or
hypotheses. The agents’ goal is to jointly identify a hypothesis
that best explains the set of observations, resulting in an
estimate of the true state of the world.
Collaboration happens when an agent combines its neigh-
bors’ beliefs (a normalized aggregated likelihood of the state
of the world) at each time step via a fusion step. The agent
then updates the combined beliefs (prior) with the likelihood
of their most recent private observation, resulting in a posterior
belief. This enables a scalable learning approach that does not
require a priori knowledge of the network structure or the
agents’ past observations, which avoids the “double counting”
problem faced in Bayesian social learning [2]–[5].
Several social learning (fusion) rules have been proposed
in the literature, including weighted averages [1], [6], ge-
ometric averages [7]–[9], constant elasticity of substitution
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models [10], and minimum operators [11], [12]. These learning
rules have been applied to undirected/directed graphs, time-
varying graphs [13], [14], weakly-connected graphs [15], [16],
agents with increasing self-confidence [17], compact hypoth-
esis sets [18], and under adversarial attacks [19]–[22]. Each
approach presents a variation of one of the above learning
rules and provides theoretical guarantees (asymptotically) that
the agents will learn the true state of the world.
The fundamental assumption in these approaches is that
the parameters of the likelihood models for each hypothesis
are known precisely. For example, each agent may collect
a large set of labeled training data or prior evidence for
each hypothesis, which allows them to identify the precise
parameters. However, collecting prior evidence is costly, and
often training happens with limited data, which can lead to
inaccurate inferences [23].
Incorporating uncertainty into the statistical models has
been studied from a non-Bayesian perspective in the fields of
possibility theory [24], probability intervals [25], and belief
functions [26], [27] by expanding beyond probability theory
to identify fixed intervals of uncertainty for each parameter
of the likelihood function. Other modeling approaches follow
a Bayesian perspective, which models the uncertainty in the
parameters as a second-order probability density function [28].
This second-order probability density function is typically a
conjugate prior of the likelihood model, allowing for a mathe-
matically convenient approach to computing the posterior dis-
tribution of the parameters conditioned on the prior evidence.
Then, the uncertain likelihood function can be computed as
the posterior predictive distribution [29], which marginalizes
the likelihood over the unknown parameters.
Recently proposed approaches have incorporated uncer-
tainty into non-Bayesian social learning theory through the
concept of uncertain models [22], [30]–[33]. An uncertain
model consists of an uncertain likelihood ratio as the like-
lihood model of each agent, which tests the consistency of the
prior evidence with a stream of private observations collected
in the testing phase. This ratio aims to identify whether the
prior evidence and the private observations are drawn from the
same/different distributions and consists of a posterior predic-
tive distribution normalized by a prior predictive distribution.
Initially, uncertain models were developed to handle cate-
gorical observations and prior evidence drawn from multino-
mial distributions [30] and were later extended for data drawn
from univariate Gaussian distributions [32]. These models
were implemented into a non-Bayesian social learning rule and
studied for static and time-varying graphs [31]. Additionally,
the social learning rule with uncertain models was adjusted to
handle communication constrained environments [33] and ad-























beliefs of each agent in the network converge to a weighted
geometric average of their uncertain likelihood ratios when
using a geometric average social learning rule, resulting in a
one-to-one relation with the centralized solution. Furthermore,
when the agents become certain in their models, i.e., know the
likelihood parameters precisely, the agents can learn the true
state of the world, providing a consistent result with traditional
social learning.
In this work, we build upon [30], [32] by identifying a
broad set of parametric distributions that enable learning with
uncertain models. Additionally, we identify conditions that
allow the agents to include model uncertainty [34], i.e., the
true statistical model is not within the parametric family of
distributions. The uncertain models are implemented into a
non-Bayesian social learning rule and show that the results are
consistent and that the works presented in [30], [32] are special
cases of the uncertain models presented herein. Additionally,
we provide an algorithmic representation of how to implement
uncertain models in a practical setting for continuous and
discrete observations. Finally, we extend the uncertain models
to handle data drawn from non-parametric distributions and
empirically show that the main results hold.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the
problem formulation, while Section III presents the general
uncertain models. Section IV implements the uncertain models
into non-Bayesian social learning and provides the asymptotic
properties of the beliefs. Section V shows the algorithmic steps
to implement uncertain models with examples of data drawn
from both discrete and continuous distributions. Section VI
provides a non-parametric framework for uncertain models and
Section VII includes a numerical analysis of both parametric
and non-parametric models. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VIII and discuss future work.
Notation: Bold symbols represent a vector/matrix, while
non-bold symbols represent its element. All vectors are col-
umn vectors unless specified. The indexes 𝑖 and 𝑗 represent
agents and 𝑡 represents time. We abbreviate the terminology
independent identically distributed as i.i.d.. We use [A]𝑖𝑗 to
represent the entry of matrix A′𝑠 𝑖th row and 𝑗th column. The










where 𝑝(𝑥) and 𝑞(𝑥) are two probability distributions over 𝑥.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Classification as a Non-Bayesian Learning Problem
We consider a group of 𝑚 heterogeneous agents connected
over a network with the task of classifying a source of
information into one of 𝑀 possible classes Θ = {𝜃1, ..., 𝜃𝑀}.
An agent 𝑖 collects sensor measurements about the source
modeled as a sequence of realizations of a random variable
distributed according to an unknown probability distribution
𝑄𝑖, conditioned on the source being of a class 𝜃*. Note
that heterogeneity of sensor modalities available at the agents
implies that measurements of different agents could be drawn
from different random distributions, i.e., 𝑄𝑖 might be different
from 𝑄𝑗 for 𝑗 ̸= 𝑖 due to different sensing phenomenology.
This classification problem can be abstracted into a dis-
tributed hypothesis testing framework, where each target class
𝜃 ∈ Θ for each agent 𝑖 is represented as a parametrized
distribution 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃), where 𝜑
𝑖
𝜃 is the set of parameters known
by the agent.1 For example, if the agent considers that each
class 𝜃 is a Gaussian distribution, the set of parameters are
𝜑𝑖𝜃 = {𝑚𝑖𝜃, (𝜆𝑖𝜃)−1}, where 𝑚𝑖𝜃 and 𝜆𝑖𝜃 are the mean and
precision, respectively. Under this setup, the common objective











where 𝑄𝑖 is the unknown distribution of the observations
conditioned on the target class. Later in the next subsection we
will describe the sources of uncertainty for the non-Bayesian
social learning problem.
Indeed, finding a solution of (2) implies finding a class
whose conditional likelihood function is statistically similar
to the distribution of the observations conditioned on the true
class. To achieve this objective, each agent 𝑖 utilizes their
sensing device to receive a stream of i.i.d. observations over
discrete time 𝑡 > 1, 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡 = {𝜔𝑖1, ..., 𝜔𝑖𝑡}, where each 𝜔𝑖𝜏 for
𝜏 ∈ {1, ..., 𝑡} is drawn from the ground truth distribution 𝑄𝑖.
In order to achieve a unique solution to (2), we impose the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. The intersection of the optimal hypotheses for
each individual agent has a unique element 𝜃*, i.e., the set⋂︀
𝑖∈ℳ Θ
*








is the set of indistinguishable hypotheses of agent 𝑖.
Assumption 1 states that each agent could potentially solve
a local problem using local information only. However, there
is no guarantee that the solution to the local problem is unique,
i.e., one individual agent might not have the capability to
identify 𝜃*. However, we assume that collectively the network
can collaborate to identify a unique hypothesis that represents
the ground truth. Therefore, 𝜃* is the unique solution to (2).
We assume agents interact over a graph 𝒢 = {ℳ, ℰ},
where ℳ is the set of agents and ℰ is the set of edges
connecting the agents. If (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ ℰ , then agents 𝑖 and 𝑗
can communicate to each other. We denote agent 𝑖’s set of
neighbors as ℳ𝑖 = {𝑗|(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ ℰ ,∀𝑗 ∈ ℳ} and each edge
is assumed to be weighted and modeled as an adjacency
matrix A. Furthermore, we assume the following properties.
Assumption 2. The graph 𝒢 and matrix A are such that:
1) A is doubly-stochastic with [A]𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 > 0 for 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗 if
and only if (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐸.
2) A has positive diagonal entries, 𝑎𝑖𝑖 > 0 for all 𝑖 ∈ ℳ.
3) The graph 𝒢 is connected.
1We assume that the parametrized distribution for each agent may vary due
to their heterogeneous sensing capabilities.
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Assumption 2 states that the adjacency matrix is ergodic,
i.e., aperiodic and irreducible, and it is a common assumption
in the literature [14]. This allows every agent to aggregate their
local information throughout the entire network. Note that our
assumptions are applicable for either directed or undirected
graphs 𝐺.
The theory of non-Bayesian social learning provides a
framework that enables the agents to jointly solve (2) in a
distributed fashion. Here, each agent 𝑖 holds a belief 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃)
at each time step 𝑡, which represents the probability that
the target class 𝜃 is the ground truth. We denote the set of
beliefs for each agent 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = {𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃)}∀𝜃∈Θ.
As seen in Figure 1, at each time 𝑡 > 1, each agent 𝑖
updates their beliefs using a social learning rule that consists





𝑡−1}∀𝑗∈ℳ𝑖 , and scaling the combined beliefs with
the likelihood of a new observation 𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜑
𝑖
𝜃). One common
belief update rule in non-Bayesian social learning is based on
a geometric average of the beliefs and is defined as follows,







Once the beliefs are updated, the agent transmits 𝜇𝑖𝑡 to their
neighbors and the process is repeated. The update rule in (4)
has the property that the belief of the target class 𝜃 that solves
the optimization problem (2) will converge to 1 almost surely
for every agent, while the remaining beliefs converge to 0,
allowing for the agents to learn the ground truth [35].
B. Uncertainty in Non-Bayesian Social Learning
The current framework of non-Bayesian social learning
theory does not account for two types of uncertainty that
are commonly found in practical applications: 1) Epistemic
uncertainty in the parameters 𝜑𝑖𝜃 of the likelihood models for
each 𝜃, and 2) Model uncertainty associated with the family
of distributions 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃).
Recall that in the non-Bayesian social learning setup, each
agent is assumed to have a parametric family of distributions
corresponding to the conditional distributions for each possible
target class. However, such models are usually built from train-
ing data. Epistemic uncertainty arises when the agents have a
limited/finite amount of training data, r𝑖𝜃 = {𝑟𝑖𝜃,𝑘}𝑘=1,...,|r𝑖𝜃|,
for each target class 𝜃 ∈ Θ. If the agent estimates the
parameters of the likelihood model using r𝑖𝜃, there is a
probability greater than 0 that a belief for a hypothesis ̂︀𝜃 ̸= 𝜃*
updated using (4) will converge to 1, while the ground truth
belief converges to 0. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the
belief update rule (4) to account for the epistemic uncertainty
in the parameters of the likelihood models by incorporating
uncertain models (see Section III).
Model uncertainty arises naturally when the underlying
physics or background knowledge of the ground truth distribu-
tion is unknown or partially known to the agents, resulting in
misspecified likelihood models [34]. Additionally, when the
agents have finite prior evidence, the uncertain models may
be within a family of distributions such that there is not be
a 𝜃 ∈ Θ such that 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃) [36] [37, p. 88], requiring
Fig. 1. Example of social learning for hypothesis testing. The world
selects a state 𝜃*, and each agent sequentially observes realizations 𝜔𝑖𝑡 of
a random variable whose probability distribution is conditioned on 𝜃*. Each
agent constructs and shares a set of beliefs 𝜇𝑖𝑡 over a social network to
cooperatively select the hypothesis that best describes the set of observations.
the agents to adjust the belief update rule (4) to handle this
uncertainty.
For example, after acquiring a finite number of samples r𝑖𝜃
for each hypothesis 𝜃, it is reasonable that the agent 𝑖 may
assume that the data is distributed according to a Normal
distribution with unknown mean 𝑚𝑖𝜃 and standard deviation
𝜎𝑖𝜃 such that 𝜑
𝑖
𝜃 = {𝑚𝑖𝜃, 𝜎𝑖𝜃}. However, it is entirely possible
that the underlying ground truth distribution 𝑄𝑖 is a student-𝑡
distribution or some otherwise arbitrary distribution with mean
and variance given by 𝜑𝑖𝜃. Nevertheless, as long as there is a
unique set of parameters 𝜑𝑖𝜃* = {𝑚𝑖𝜃* , 𝜎𝑖𝜃*} that minimizes the
KL divergence between the ground truth distribution 𝑄𝑖 and
the parameterized distribution 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃) for hypothesis 𝜃 = 𝜃*,
learning can occur.2
The overall goal of this work is to incorporate both
epistemic and model uncertainties into non-Bayesian social
learning theory and provide theoretical guarantees on the
convergence properties of the uncertain beliefs.
III. GENERAL UNCERTAIN MODELS
In this section, we present a general class of uncertain
models and their asymptotic properties for a single agent
that has collected a limited amount of training data for each
class [30]–[32]. For simplicity and ease of presentation, we
drop the subscript 𝑖 in our notation for the remainder of this
section. Later in Section IV we extend this to the distributed
setup.
A. The Uncertain Likelihood Ratio
The first step in deriving the uncertain likelihood ratio is to
identify the parameters 𝜑𝜃 of the likelihood model 𝑃 (·|𝜑𝜃).
Consider that the agent has collected a set of prior evidence
r𝜃 = {𝑟𝑘,𝜃}𝑘=1,...,|r𝜃| (training data) for each hypothesis
𝜃 ∈ Θ, which consists of a set of i.i.d. samples drawn
from the distribution 𝑄𝑖𝜃, where the amount of prior evidence
|r𝜃| collected for each hypothesis may vary. Then, we make
the following assumption about the likelihood models that
allows the agent to model their epistemic uncertainty in the
parameters 𝜑𝜃.
Assumption 3. The set of sufficient statistics of the family of
distributions 𝑃 (·|𝜑) is finite.
2The parameters 𝜑𝑖𝜃* associate to the Maximum Likelihood estimate of the
parameters given an infinite amount of observations 𝜔𝑖.
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Assumption 3 implies that there exists a conjugate distribu-
tion to 𝑃 (·|𝜑) that models the distribution of the parameters
𝜑 [38]. Therefore, we can take a Bayesian approach to mod-
eling the epistemic uncertainty in the parameters by utilizing








𝑃 (r𝜃|𝜑)𝑓0(𝜑)𝑑𝜑 is the normalization
factor; 𝑃 (r𝜃|𝜑) is the assumed family of distributions; and
𝑓0(𝜑) = 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(∅)) is the conjugate prior of 𝑃 (·|𝜑) with
hyperparameters 𝜓(∅) chosen s.t. the prior is uninformative
with full support over the parameter space Φ. Note that
conjugate distributions allow for the agent to simply update the
hyperparameters of the posterior as a function of the amount
of data present, for example the prior evidence r𝜃 as in (5).
Examples of the update equations for specific parametric
distributions are presented in Section V.
Then, because the parameters are only known within a
distribution 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(r𝜃)), the agent must use a posterior pre-
dictive distribution in lieu of the likelihood model to form the
uncertain likelihood, i.e., the uncertain likelihood of a set of
measurements 𝜔1:𝑡 for 𝑡 > 1 is defined aŝ︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡|r𝜃) = ∫︁
Φ
𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡|𝜑)𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(r𝜃))𝑑𝜑. (6)
Normally, the agent would then construct a likelihood ratio
test by normalizing the uncertain likelihood over the set of
hypotheses. However, when the amount of prior evidence
varies between hypotheses, i.e., |r𝜃| ̸= |r̂︀𝜃| for some 𝜃 ̸= ̂︀𝜃,
the uncertain likelihoods become incommensurable since they
do not have a common standard of measurement, as shown
in [30]. Instead, the agents evaluate each hypothesis indepen-
dently and normalize the uncertain likelihood by the model of
complete ignorance to form the uncertain likelihood ratio as
follows
Λ𝜃(𝑡) =
̂︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡|r𝜃)̂︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡|r𝜃 = ∅) , (7)
where ̂︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡|r𝜃 = ∅) = ∫︀Φ 𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡|𝜑)𝑓0(𝜑)𝑑𝜑. The model
of complete ignorance is defined as a prior predictive distri-
bution of the measurement sequence conditioned on the agent
collecting zero prior evidence.
B. The Uncertain Likelihood Update
Thus far, we have derived the uncertain likelihood ratio
based on an agent collecting a set of measurements 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡 up
to time 𝑡 > 1. However, in the typical setting, the agent will
sequentially collect a single measurement at each time step,
requiring that uncertain likelihood ratio to be decomposed into
a recursive function.
This is achieved by first expressing the uncertain likeli-
hood (6) as follows,










where the first line is due to the i.i.d. observations, while the









= 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓({𝜔1:𝑡−1, r𝜃})) ̂︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡−1|r𝜃), (9)
and the fact that ̂︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡−1|r𝜃) is a constant for a given
sequence of observations 𝜔1:𝑡−1. Similarly, we can write the
model of complete ignorance as follows,̂︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡|r𝜃 = ∅)
= ̂︀𝑃 (𝜔1:𝑡−1|r𝜃 = ∅)∫︁
Φ
𝑃 (𝜔𝑡|𝜑)𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(𝜔1:𝑡−1))𝑑𝜑. (10)
Then, we can rewrite the uncertain likelihood ratio in the
following recursive form,
Λ𝜃(𝑡) = ℓ𝜃(𝜔𝑡)Λ𝜃(𝑡− 1), (11)








C. Asymptotic Properties of the Uncertain Likelihood Ratio
Next, we compute the asymptotic properties of the uncertain
likelihood ratio. First, we must state the following assumptions
regarding the statistical models for each hypothesis 𝜃.
Assumption 4. For each agent and all 𝜃 ∈ Θ, the following
properties hold:
∙ The distributions 𝑄 and 𝑃 (𝜔|𝜑𝜃) are bounded, i.e., 𝑄 <
∞ and 𝑃 (𝜔|𝜑𝜃) <∞ for all values of 𝜔, and
∙ The distribution 𝑄 is absolutely continuous3 with respect
to 𝑃 (𝜔|𝜑𝜃).
Assumption 4 ensures that both distributions 𝑄 and 𝑃 (·|𝜑𝜃)
for all 𝜃 ∈ Θ do not include any singularities and that the
support of 𝑄 is within the support of 𝑃 (·|𝜑𝜃).
Assumption 5. There exists a unique set of parameters 𝜑𝜃*







where 𝜑𝜃 could equal 𝜑𝜃* .
Assumption 5 means that the set of parameters that min-
imize the KL divergence between the ground truth and the
likelihood models for 𝜃* is unique. Furthermore, the set of
parameters that minimize the KL between the underlying
models 𝑄𝜃 and the likelihood model for 𝜃 is unique.4
3A measure 𝜇 is dominated by (or absolutely continuous with respect to)
a measure 𝜆 if 𝜆(𝐵) = 0 implies 𝜇(𝐵) = 0 for every measurable set 𝐵.
4Note that when the KL divergence is greater than 0, the likelihood models
are misspecified and model uncertainty is present.
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Assumption 6. For each agent and all 𝜃 ∈ Θ, the likelihood
function 𝑃 (·|𝜑𝜃) and the conjugate prior 𝑓0(𝜑) abide by the
regularity conditions as stipulated in [39], [40].
Assumption 6 holds when the distributions are sufficiently
smooth and Assumption 5 hold. For a detailed list of the
regularity conditions, please see Appendix C.
Next, we make the following proposition regarding the
asymptotic properties of the conjugate distributions.
Proposition III.1. Let Assumptions 4-6 hold. Then, the pos-
terior distribution of 𝜑 has the following properties:
(a) When prior evidence is finite, i.e., |r𝜃| <∞, and number
of observations grows unboundedly, i.e., 𝑡 → ∞, the




𝑓(𝜑|𝜓({𝜔1:𝑡, r𝜃})) = 𝛿𝜑𝜃* (𝜑) (14)
where 𝛿𝜑𝜃 is the Kronecker delta function centered at 𝜑𝜃
and 𝜑𝜃* is defined in (13).
(b) When an agent is certain, i.e., |r𝜃| = ∞, the posterior
distribution 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(r𝜃)) computed before collecting ob-
servations converges in probability as
lim
|r𝜃|→∞
𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(r𝜃)) = 𝛿𝜑𝜃 (𝜑). (15)
where 𝜑𝜃 is defined in (13).
Proposition III.1 follows from the Bernstein-Von Mises
theorem [23], [37], [39]–[44], where the posterior distributions
are asymptotically normal with a covariance decaying to 0
asymptotically. Moreover, the mean is the maximum likelihood
estimate that minimizes the KL divergence. This indicates that
there exist families of parametric distributions that allow for
the posterior (or prior) predictive distribution to asymptotically
converge to the likelihood function evaluated at the exact
parameters. Now, we are ready to analyze the asymptotic
properties of the uncertain likelihood ration in (7).
Theorem III.2. Let Assumptions 4-6 hold, and assume that
the amount of prior evidence for each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ is
finite, i.e., |r𝜃| <∞. Then, the uncertain likelihood ratio (7).
























by simply applying Bayes’ rule to update the posterior dis-
tribution 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(𝜔1:𝑡)). Then, using property (a) of Proposi-
tion III.1, the posterior distribution converges in probability
to a delta function as 𝑡 → ∞, i.e., lim𝑡→∞ 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(𝜔1:𝑡)) =
𝛿𝜑𝜃* (𝜑). This results in (17) converging in probability to
Λ𝜃(𝑡) =
𝑃 (r𝜃|𝜑𝜃*)̂︀𝑃 (r𝜃) , (18)
where ̂︀𝑃 (r𝜃) = ∫︀Φ 𝑃 (r𝜃|𝜑)𝑓0(𝜑)𝑑𝜑. Then, if we multiply the
right hand side of (18) by 𝑓0(𝜑𝜃*)/𝑓0(𝜑𝜃*) and apply Bayes
rule (see (5)), (16) follows directly.
Following the same logic as in Theorem III.2, we now
provide a consistency result.
Corollary III.2.1. Let Assumptions 4- 6 hold and assume that
the agent is certain for each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ, i.e., |r𝜃|=∞.




Λ𝜃(𝑡)=∞, if 𝜑𝜃 = 𝜑𝜃* , and
lim
𝑡→∞,|r𝜃|→∞
Λ𝜃(𝑡) = 0, if 𝜑𝜃 ̸= 𝜑𝜃* . (19)
Proof. First, noting that the prior evidence r𝜃 and private
observations 𝜔1:𝑡 are i.i.d, the order in which the data is
received is also independent, allowing the limiting operations












Noting from Proposition III.1 that 𝑓(𝜑𝜃* |𝜓(r𝜃)) converges in
probability to 𝛿𝜑𝜃 (𝜑), the numerator in (20) either diverges
to ∞ if 𝜑𝜃* = 𝜑𝜃 or converges to 0 otherwise. Then, our
result is achieved since 𝑓0(𝜑𝜃*) to be strictly positive and
bounded. Note that this result is also achieved when the limit
as |r𝜃| → ∞ is applied first, thus justifying the interchange of
operations.
Theorem III.2 shows that the uncertain likelihood ratio
eventually converges to a finite value when the amount of
prior evidence is finite, and the number of observations grows
without bound. When the ground truth parameters 𝜑𝜃* lie
near the mode of the distribution 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(r𝜃)), the ratio will
converge to a value greater than 1, indicating that the prior
evidence and the observations are consistent. However, when
the parameters 𝜑𝜃* lie within the tail of 𝑓(𝜑|𝜓(r𝜃)), the
ratio will converge to a value much less than 1, indicating
that the distributions are inconsistent with each other. Then,
Corollary III.2.1 shows that as the amount of prior evidence
grows without bound, only the hypothesis with parameters
𝜑𝜃 = 𝜑𝜃* = argmin𝜑∈Φ𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄‖𝑃 (·|𝜑)) will have a ratio
> 0, allowing the agents to learn the set of hypotheses
indistinguishable with the ground truth, i.e., Θ*. These results
are consistent with but more general than the uncertain models
presented in [30], [32].
IV. NON-BAYESIAN SOCIAL LEARNING WITH UNCERTAIN
MODELS
In this section, we switch back to the networked setting
and present a belief update rule that adjusts (2) to handle both
epistemic and model uncertainties (c.f. Section II-B).
Consider that each agent 𝑖 collects prior evidence r𝑖𝜃 and
constructs a belief 𝜇𝑖0(𝜃) = 1 for each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ
at time 𝑡 = 0.Then, for each time step 𝑡 > 1, each agent se-
quentially (i) communicates their beliefs to their neighbors, (ii)
6
receives a new observation, and (iii) updates their beliefs using
a social learning rule. This results in each agent 𝑖 having access
to the information 𝛾𝑖𝑡+1(𝜃) = {𝜔𝑖𝑡+1, r𝑖𝜃, {𝜇
𝑗
𝑡 (𝜃)}∀𝑗∈ℳ𝑖} for
each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ at each time step 𝑡+ 1. Then, agent 𝑖










where the product on the right hand side of (21) represents a
geometric average of their neighbors beliefs and ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔
𝑖
𝑡+1) is
the uncertain likelihood update defined in (12). Note that the
social learning rule (21) differs from (2).
With the proposed social learning rule stated, we now
present the convergence properties of the beliefs with uncertain
models. Note that auxiliary lemmas and proofs are provided
in the appendix for ease of presentation.
Theorem IV.1. Let Assumptions 2 and 4-6 hold and assume
that the amount of prior evidence for each agent 𝑖 and
each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ is finite, i.e., |r𝑖𝜃| < ∞. Then, the









in probability for each 𝑖 ∈ ℳ, where ̃︀Λ𝑗𝜃 is defined in (16).
Theorem IV.1 states that the beliefs reach consensus and
converge to the geometric average of the agents’ asymptotic
uncertain likelihood ratios. In fact asymptotically, the beliefs
have a one-to-one relation with the centralized uncertain
likelihood ratio defined as follows
lim
𝑡→∞






The centralized solution follows from the fact that the ob-
servations of each agent are i.i.d. and independent over the
network.
Since each of agent 𝑖’s uncertain likelihood ratios converge
to a finite value when |r𝜃| < ∞, ∀𝜃 ∈ Θ, every agents’
beliefs will converge to a value between (0,∞) and are
interpreted in the same fashion as discussed in Section III
after Corollary III.2.1. Informally, a much greater belief than
1 provides evidence that the prior evidence and observations
are consistent, i.e., drawn from the same distribution, while a
value much less than 1 provides evidence that the data sets are
inconsistent. Just as before, the agents cannot decide on the
hypothesis that exactly matches the ground truth with finite
evidence. However, when all of the agents become certain,
i.e., |r𝑖𝜃| → ∞ ∀𝑖 ∈ ℳ, 𝜃 ∈ Θ, learning the ground truth
hypothesis is possible, as captured by the following theorem.
Theorem IV.2. Let Assumptions 1-6 hold and assume that
every agents is certain, i.e., |r𝑖𝜃| → ∞ ∀𝑖 ∈ ℳ. Then, the
beliefs for each agent 𝑖 ∈ ℳ generated using the update rule





∞ if 𝜃 = 𝜃*,
0 otherwise (24)
in probability.
Theorem IV.2 indicates that the collective group of agents
can uniquely identify the ground truth hypothesis since the
agents’ beliefs for every 𝜃 ̸= 𝜃* will converge to 0 and
only the hypothesis 𝜃 = 𝜃* will diverge to ∞. This result is
consistent with traditional non-Bayesian social learning theory,
indicating that general uncertain models allow agents to learn
asymptotically.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF UNCERTAIN MODELS
This section provides the computational steps required to
determine the uncertain models for implementation. Once the
steps are formalized, the policies for multinomial and Multi-
variate Gaussian likelihood models are presented to provide
examples of discrete and continuous uncertain models.
A. Steps to identify the Uncertain Likelihood Update
Step 1: Select n a family of probability distributions. The
first step requires identifying a reasonable family of parame-
terized distributions suitable for the particular application, i.e.,
𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑). First, the sensing device dictates whether a discrete
or continuous distribution family describes the measurements.
For instance, photon counts of an infrared detector are Poisson
distributed, while pressure measurements of an acoustic sensor
lead to a continuous distribution. The underlying physics of the
phenomenon observed provides insights into a proper family
of parametric distributions to model the measurements for dif-
ferent world states. One should be conscious of balancing the
dimensionality of the parameters with the ability to distinguish
between the various world states. Furthermore, note that the
family of the likelihood model must abide by Assumption 6.
Step 2: Determine the natural conjugate prior. Next, it
is well known that when the likelihood model has a fixed-
dimensional set of sufficient statistics, there exists a conju-
gate prior distribution [38], 𝑓0(𝜑𝑖) = 𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓(∅)), where
𝜓(∅) = 𝜓𝑖0 are the natural hyperparameters and are chosen
such that the prior is uninformative. The conjugate prior is
chosen based on the parameters that are unknown to the agent.
For example, if the family of likelihoods is Gaussian with
unknown mean and known variance, the conjugate prior is also
a Gaussian distribution. A detailed list/discussion of conjugate
prior distributions can be found in [38], [45].
Step 3: Determine how to update the hyperparameters.
The benefit of using conjugate priors is that they are closed
under multiplication, which enables the posterior distribution
𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓𝑖(x)) computed based on a set of data (observations
and/or prior evidence) x to be in the same family of distri-
butions as 𝑓0(𝜑𝑖), with hyperparameters that are updated in a
simple recursive form. Consider that the agent has previously
collected data points x, which lead to the hyperparameters
𝜓𝑖(x). Next, the agent collects a new set of measurements
x+. Then, there exists a function 𝑔(x+, 𝜓𝑖(x)) s.t.
𝜓𝑖({x+,x}) = 𝑔(x+, 𝜓𝑖(x)). (25)
Initially, the agent collects a set of prior evidence r𝑖𝜃, which






where 𝜓𝑖0 are the set of vacuous hyperparameters that pro-
vide a noninformative prior. Then, the agent sequentially
collects observations 𝜔𝑖𝑡 at time 𝑡 > 1 and updates the
hyperparameters of the uncertain likelihood (6) according to
𝜓𝑖({r𝑖𝜃,𝜔𝑖1:𝑡}) = 𝑔(𝜔𝑖𝑡, 𝜓𝑖({r𝑖𝜃,𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1})). At the same time,
the agent also keeps track of the hyperparameters of the
model of complete ignorance (defined below (7)) according
to 𝜓𝑖(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡) = 𝑔(𝜔
𝑖
𝑡, 𝜓
𝑖(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1)). Examples of 𝑔(x
+, 𝜓𝑖(x))
can be found in the following subsections.
Step 4: Compute the normalization factor 𝑍(x+,x).
When the agent collects a new data point x+ and has
previously collected the data set x, the posterior conjugate









𝑃 𝑖(x+|𝜑𝑖)𝑃 𝑖(x|𝜑)𝑓0(𝜑𝑖)𝑑𝜑𝑖 (27)
is the normalization factor. In many situations, 𝑍(x+,x) can
be analytically computed, see [38]. However, if 𝑍(x+,x) does
not have a closed form, the agents must use numerical meth-
ods to compute the normalization factor, which significantly
increases the runtime performance.
Step 5: Compute the uncertain likelihood update. Next,
the agent can simply compute the uncertain likelihood up-
date (12) as a ratio of normalization factors. In this case, x+
is substituted with the measurement 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1. Then, if we expand
the priors in (12), as shown in (26), and replace the data set x
with {𝜔𝑖1:𝑡, r𝑖𝜃} and 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡 for the numerator and denominator,









B. Multinomial Uncertain Models
The first example consists of the multinomial uncertain
models presented in [30]. Here, we assume that the prior
evidence r𝑖𝜃 = {𝑟𝑖1𝜃, ..., 𝑟𝑖𝐾𝜃} for each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ
represent a set of counts and each observation 𝜔𝑖𝑡 ∈ {1, ...,𝐾}
is categorical where 𝐾 > 2. This results in the agents assum-
ing the family of multinomial distributions as their likelihood
functions with parameters 𝜑𝑖𝜃 = 𝜋
𝑖
𝜃 = {𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃|∀𝑘 = 1, ...,𝐾},
where 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝜃 is the probability that an observation is drawn




𝑘𝜃 = 1. The natural

















𝑘(x)) is the multivariate beta





are vacuous and set to 𝜓𝑖𝑘0 = 1 for each category 𝑘, which
applies a uniform distribution over the probability simplex of
the parameters 𝜋𝑖.
Next, the agent computes the initial hyperparameters due to









Then, when the agent collects a new observation 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘 at
time 𝑡 > 1, the hyperparameters are updated as follows
𝜓𝑖({𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘,𝑥}) = 𝜓𝑖(𝑥) + 𝛿𝑘, (30)
where 𝛿𝑘 is a vector of zeros with a 1 located in element 𝑘, i.e.,
the hyperparameters represent a set of counts of the combined
data set {𝜔𝑖𝑡,𝑥}.










the uncertain likelihood update (28) becomes,
ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔
𝑖




(|r𝑖𝜃|+ 𝑡+𝐾)(𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 1)
, (32)
where 𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the set of counts of category 𝑘 from data set
𝜔𝑖1:𝑡. For a detailed derivation, please see [30].
C. Multivariate Gaussian Uncertain Models
Next, we consider that the prior evidence and observations
for agent 𝑖 are drawn from a 𝑑-dimensional Multivariate
Gaussian distribution with unknown mean and variance, i.e.,
𝜑𝑖 = {m𝑖,Σ𝑖}. The natural conjugate prior of the Multi-
variate Gaussian distribution is the Normal Inverse Wishart
























































is the normalization factor and Γ𝑑(𝛼) =
𝜋𝑑(𝑑−1)/4
∏︀𝑑
𝑖=1 Γ((2𝛼 + 1 − 𝑖)/2) is the multivariate
gamma function. The initial hyperparameters are defined
as 𝜓𝑖0 = {𝜛0, 𝜅0, 𝜈0,S0}, where 𝜛0 is the prior mean,
𝜅0 and 𝜈0 are factors of how strongly we believe in the
priors, and S0 is the prior mean for Σ𝑖. A noniformative
prior [37] (suggested by Jeffery’s) would suggest selecting
the parameters 𝜛0 = 0, 𝜅0 → 0, 𝜈0 → −1, and |S0| → 0,
which results in an improper prior. However in practice, it
is suggested to use a weakly informative prior [46], where
𝜅0 is set to some small number, 𝜈0 = 𝑑 + 2, and 𝜛0 and
S0 are set based on some intuition of the data. In this work,
we set 𝜅0 = 1, 𝜈0 = 𝑑 + 2, 𝜛0 = 0, and S0 = I to be the
hyperparameters of the model of complete ignorance, where
I is the identify matrix.
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(a) 2x2 Grid (b) 4x4 Grid (c) 8x8 Grid (d) 16x16 Grid
Fig. 2. Various partition structures tested
Next, the agent computes the initial hyperparameters due to
the prior evidence as follows

















′ and 𝑟𝑖𝜃 is the sample mean of
the prior evidence.
Then, when the agent collects a new observation 𝜔𝑖𝑡 at time
𝑡 > 1, the hyperparameters are sequentially updated using the
following recursive functions





S({𝜔𝑖𝑡,x}) = S(x) + 𝜔𝑖𝑡(𝜔𝑖𝑡)′ + 𝜅(x)𝜛(x)𝜛(x)′
− 𝜅({𝜔𝑖𝑡,x})𝜛({𝜔𝑖𝑡,x})𝜛({𝜔𝑖𝑡,x})′, (36)
such that the data sets x are x = {𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1, r𝑖𝜃} and x = 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1,
respectively.
Next, we exploit the fact that a multivariate Student 𝑡-
distribution can be written as a Gaussian mixture [46] resulting




= 𝑡̂︀𝜈(x)(x+,𝜛(x), ̂︀S(x)), (37)
where ̂︀𝜈(x) = 𝜈(x)− 𝑑+ 1 and
̂︀S(x) = 𝜅(x) + 1
𝜅(x)(𝜈(x)− 𝑑+ 1)
S(x).




𝑡̂︀𝜈({𝜔𝑖1:𝑡,r𝑖𝜃})(𝜔𝑖𝑡+1,𝜛({𝜔𝑖1:𝑡, r𝑖𝜃}), ̂︀S({𝜔𝑖1:𝑡, r𝑖𝜃}))
𝑡̂︀𝜈(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡)(𝜔𝑖𝑡+1,𝜛𝑖(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡), ̂︀S𝑖(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡)) .
(38)
VI. NONPARAMETRIC FRAMEWORK FOR GENERAL
UNCERTAIN MODELS
Thus far, we have restricted the parametric family of dis-
tributions 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃) for each agent 𝑖 to meet the regularity
conditions of Assumption 6. However, the best parametric
family of distributions may not be known a priori. While any
distribution can be modeled by multimodal distributions, such
as a mixture of Gaussians, the complexity of the resulting
conjugate prior grows exponentially with more observations.
Furthermore, it can be the case that the natural conjugate prior
does not lead to an analytically computable normalization
factor 𝑍(x+|𝜓𝑖(x)). Therefore, this section presents a non-
parametric approach to simplify the problem by modeling
these challenging distributions as histograms with multinomial
likelihoods.
A. Modeling Uncertainty in Nonparametric Data using Multi-
nomial Uncertain Models
In this setting, we assume that each agent collects a set of
prior evidence for each hypothesis, where each observation lies
in a 𝑑-dimensional Euclidean space. Our goal is to partition
the Euclidean space into a set of finite rectangular cuboids
that allow prior evidence and future private observations to be
mapped to a histogram. This then allows the agent to model
the data as a multinomial distribution, which abides by the
regularity conditions.
Consider that each agent 𝑖 defines a rectangle 𝑅𝑖 =
[𝑐11, 𝑐
1





] consisting of all x ∈ R𝑑 such that
𝑐ℎ1 6 𝑥
ℎ < 𝑐ℎ𝑚ℎ for all ℎ = 1, ..., 𝑑, which represents the
space that contains majority of the prior evidence of every
hypothesis. Then, let agent 𝑖 define a set of hyperplanes cℎ =
{𝑐ℎ1 , 𝑐ℎ2 , ..., 𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑑} for all ℎ = 1, ..., 𝑑 such that the rectangle 𝑅𝑖
is partitioned into a rectilinear grid, which is a tessellation
of the space into rectangular cuboids. We assume that the
rectangular cuboids in 𝑅𝑖 are congruent. Now, consider that
each hyperplane 𝑙 = 1, ...,𝑚ℎ in dimension ℎ = 1, ..., 𝑑,
i.e., 𝑐ℎ𝑙 , extends beyond the rectangle 𝑅
𝑖 to partition the
entire Euclidean space into a set of 𝐾 =
∏︀𝑑
ℎ=1(𝑚ℎ + 1)
rectangular cuboids. This results in rectangular cuboids outside
of the rectangle 𝑅𝑖 that are not congruent with the inner
cuboids. An example of a 2D Euclidean space partitioned into
a rectilinear grid is shown in Figure 2, where the black dotted
lines represent the hyperplanes along each dimension.5
Once the Euclidean space is partitioned, the prior evidence
for each hypothesis is mapped to a histogram where each
bar represents the number of times the prior evidence falls
within the specific rectangular cuboid. Now, we can represent





where 𝑘 = 1, ...,𝐾 is the index of the rectangular cuboid. This
5In general, the dimension of the Euclidean space 𝑑, number of rectangular
cuboids 𝐾, and location of hyperplanes cℎ in each dimension ℎ could vary
between agents. However, for ease of presentation, we assume in this work

















































Fig. 3. Belief evolution of well-specified Gaussian uncertain models. The solid lines represent the beliefs 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃), while the dashed lines represent the asymptotic




transformation allows the observations to be analogous to data
being drawn from a multinomial distribution parameterized by





distribution of the parameters, i.e., 𝑓(𝜋𝑖𝜃|r𝑖𝜃) defined in (29),
are modeled according to a Dirichlet distribution, which abides
by the regularity conditions, allowing our main results to
hold [30], [31]. Therefore, the agents can implement the
multinomial uncertain models, as presented in Section V-B.
The main challenges associated with approximating a non-
parametric distribution are as follows:
1) How to design grids to distinguish the hypotheses, and
what are the effects on the general beliefs as 𝐾 increases?
2) Should the hyperplanes be uniformly spaced inside R𝑑, or
should they be selected based on the sample distribution
of the prior evidence, e.g., a Voronoi cell?
In this preliminary study, we initiate the investigation of the
first challenge above and leave a complete analysis of both
challenges for future work.
VII. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
This section presents two numerical studies to validate
the network’s convergence properties with uncertain models
empirically. First, we consider that the underlying ground truth
distribution is Gaussian to verify that the results hold for well-
specified likelihood models. Then, we consider that the ground
truth distribution could be multimodal, non-parametric, or have
a normalization factor that is hard to compute, to verify that













Fig. 4. Social network structure considered in the numerical examples.
A. Well-specified likelihood models
We begin by considering a network of 4 agents connected
according to a directed cycle graph with self-loops, as seen in
Figure 4. In this example, we assume that the possible states of
the world lead to three possible observation distributions, 𝑄1,
𝑄2, and 𝑄3. Each distribution is modeled as a multivariate
TABLE I






























DEFINITION OF HYPOTHESES FOR EACH AGENT
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4
𝜃1 𝑄1 𝑄1 𝑄1 𝑄1
𝜃2 𝑄1 𝑄2 𝑄1 𝑄1
𝜃3 𝑄1 𝑄1 𝑄3 𝑄1
Gaussian distribution, i.e., 𝑄𝑚 ∼ 𝒩 (m𝑚,Σ𝑚), where the
mean and variance for each model is provided in Table I.
Furthermore, We assume that the observations for each agent
𝑖 are drawn from the first distribution, i.e., 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡 ∼ 𝑄1.
Each agent is assumed to possess three hypotheses about the
state of the world, i.e., Θ = {𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3}, such that 𝜃1 = 𝜃*.
The underlying distribution for each hypothesis seen by each
agent 𝑖 is one of the three distributions given in Table II. It is
easy to see that social learning via the rule (21) is needed for
the agents to collectively identify the true state of the world.
We conducted five experiments, where each simulation
consists of each agent collecting a random amount of prior
evidence for each hypothesis drawn from a uniform ran-
dom variable within the following ranges, [1, 500], [500, 103],
[103, 104], [104, 105], and ∞, respectively. The first 4 ranges
are used to validate the results of Theorem IV.1 numerically
and present the effects of how the amount of prior evidence
changes the overall point of convergence, while the final
experiment is used to validate the results of Theorem IV.2.
We conducted 10 Monte Carlo simulation for each exper-
iment, where the observations 𝜔𝑖1:𝑡 were regenerated during
each run. Here, we assume that the agents’ likelihood models
are well-specified, i.e., the likelihoods are Gaussian. Therefore,
the agents implement the uncertain likelihood update (38),
presented in Section V-C.
Figure 3 shows the ensemble average beliefs of each agent
for each hypothesis. The first result seen is that the agents’




(1/4) for each experiment and hypothesis, numeri-

























































DEFINITION OF MIXTURE MODELS.















































’ m34 = m14
𝑝1 =
[︀
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
]︀
𝑝2 = 𝑝1 𝑝3 = 𝑝1




























as the amount of prior evidence grows, the beliefs for 𝜃1 are
diverging toward infinity, while the beliefs on 𝜃2 and 𝜃3 are
decaying to 0 at a rate of the average KL divergence, indicating
the correctness of Theorem IV.2.
Figure 3 also shows that when the agents have a low
amount of evidence, the beliefs converge to value > 1 and are
considered consistent with the ground truth hypothesis and
cannot be ruled out. When the agents acquire enough prior
evidence for 𝜃 ̸= 𝜃*, the beliefs eventually converge to a value
< 1 allowing them to identify hypotheses that are inconsistent
with the ground truth.
An attractive property of the beliefs generated by the
uncertain likelihood ratio can be seen in Figure 3(b). For prior
evidence |r𝑖𝜃| 6 103, the beliefs monotonically increase to the
asymptotic point of convergence. Then, when |r𝑖𝜃| > 103, the
agents have acquired enough evidence such that the beliefs
“peak-out” and reach a maximum value before decreasing.
Even though they reach this peak value, it is still possible
that the beliefs will converge to value > 1, as indicated by
the experiment with |r𝑖𝜃| ∈ [103, 104]. This property is also in
Figure 3(c), except here, as the KL divergence increases, the
amount of prior evidence needed to evolve to the peak value
decreases. This property indicates that the hypothesis with the
largest peak value is the closest to 𝜃*. This will be explored
further with active learning approaches as future work.
B. Misspecified likelihood models
In this experiment, we followed the same setup as be-
fore, however, we assume that the three possible states
of the world, 𝑄1, 𝑄2, and 𝑄3 are distribution according
to a four-component Gaussian mixture model, i.e., 𝑄𝑚 =∑︀4
𝑐=1 𝑝𝑚,𝑐𝒩 (m𝑚,𝑐,Σ𝑚), where 𝑝𝑚,𝑐 is the mixture prob-
abilities. The parameters of the mixture models considered
are defined in Table III. First, we consider that the agents
make a naive assumption that the observations are drawn
from the family of Gaussian parametric models, although the
possible hypotheses are multi-modal. The Gaussian fit of each
mixture is shown in Table III and represents the parameters
that minimize the KL divergence between the underlying
mixture and a Gaussian distribution. In this setting, the agents
implement the uncertain likelihood update (38) presented in
Section V-C.
The belief evolution for the misspecified Gaussian models
is shown in Figure 5. As seen, all of the properties discussed
for well-specified Gaussian models hold here, numerically
indicating that Theorems IV.1 and IV.2 hold. However, due
to the abstraction of the underlying distribution, the agents
cannot distinguish between 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 for any amount of prior
evidence because both hypotheses exhibit the same mean and
covariance. Therefore, when the assumed parametric family of
distributions is misspecified, modeling uncertainty may result
in confusion between hypotheses with a probability of > 0.
To overcome this issue, we then implemented the non-
parametric approach presented in Section VI, where we par-
tition the observation space and treat the cell occupants as
samples drawn from an unknown multinomial distribution.
We varied the number of rectangular cuboids between 𝐾 =
{4, 16, 64, 256} by constructing a 2 × 2, 4 × 4, 8 × 8, and
16× 16 grid as shown in Figure 2. Here, we set the center of
the grid to (0, 0) and the rectangle 𝑅𝑖 = [−3,−3]×[3, 3] for all
𝑖 ∈ ℳ. The boundary hyperplanes were chosen to encompass
most of the samples generated from the distribution for each
hypothesis. Then, the agents utilize the uncertain likelihood
update (32).
Figure 6 presents the evolution of the beliefs for each
hypothesis and each grid. The rows represent a single hy-
pothesis, while the columns represent the grid size. Starting
















































































































































































Fig. 6. Belief evolution of multinomial uncertain models utilizing the nonparametric approach presented in Section VI. The solid lines represent the beliefs




grid size for all hypotheses, i.e., 2×2, result in the agents not
distinguishing the ground truth. Then, as one increases the
number of grids, the maximum value of the beliefs increases
for each experiment. This is because of the slope increases as
the dimension of the multinomial distribution increases.
In this case, as the grids become finer, the non-parametric
approach can distinguish the ground truth from 𝜃2, unlike the
naive Gaussian assumption presented in Figure 5. However, the
beliefs of 𝜃3 require sufficient prior evidence and finer grid size
to distinguish it from the ground truth. With a 4× 4 grid and
finite prior evidence, the beliefs converge to a value of > 1 or
close to 1, indicating that the hypothesis may be consistent
with the ground truth. Once we move to the 8 × 8 grid,
the agents can distinguish 𝜃3 for the case when |r𝑖𝜃| > 103,
indicating that a finer grid size might result in the beliefs
converging to a smaller number. However, when we implement
the 16 × 16 grid for 𝜃3, more prior evidence is required to
distinguish the hypothesis from the ground truth. The grid
size must be fine enough to distinguish the prior evidence but
not too fine to require more than the available prior evidence.
Furthermore, the computational complexity increases for finer
grids. The selection of best grid size in terms of type I and II
errors will be investigated as future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper generalizes earlier work on uncertain mod-
els [30], which utilizes the theory of non-Bayesian social
learning to provide a distributed hypothesis testing framework
with a network of heterogeneous agents receiving a stream
of observations from a general class of measurement distri-
butions. We assume that the agents have limited amounts of
training data to learn the parameters of the likelihood models
for each hypothesis, requiring uncertain models to act as their
surrogate likelihood function. We first present the general
uncertain models and identify a set of regularity conditions
that guarantee that the agents will learn the true likelihood
model asymptotically, while accurately encompassing their
epistemic uncertainty when training data is limited. Then, we
implemented the uncertain models into non-Bayesian social
learning and showed that the agents could infer the true
state of the world asymptotically. Additionally, we show that
as the agents become certain about the parameters of the
likelihood models, the beliefs are consistent with traditional
non-Bayesian social learning, and the network learns the
ground truth hypothesis. We then provided a detailed road map
to guide the network designer to implement uncertain models
and examples for continuous and discrete measurement distri-
butions. Finally, we provided an initial study on extending the
uncertain models to non-parametric measurement distributions
and showed numerically that our framework provides the same
properties as the parametric case.
As future work, we will expand upon the non-parametric
framework to further study the main challenges presented at
the end of Section VI. This includes identifying the trade-offs
in grid design and the number of bins based on Type I and
Type II errors and providing error bounds. Additionally, we
will investigate active learning approaches that utilize these
error bounds to determine if an agent must collect more prior
evidence to distinguish the ground truth hypothesis.
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[13] A. Nedić, A. Olshevsky, and C. A. Uribe, “Nonasymptotic convergence
rates for cooperative learning over time-varying directed graphs,” in
American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 5884–5889.
[14] ——, “Fast convergence rates for distributed non-Bayesian learning,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62, no. 11, pp. 5538–
5553, 2017.
[15] H. Salami, B. Ying, and A. H. Sayed, “Social learning over weakly
connected graphs,” IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Pro-
cessing over Networks, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 222–238, 2017.
[16] ——, “Belief control strategies for interactions over weakly-connected
graphs,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.05479, 2018.
[17] C. A. Uribe and A. Jadbabaie, “On increasing self-confidence in non-
Bayesian social learning over time-varying directed graphs,” in American
Control Conference. IEEE, 2019, pp. 3532–3537.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM IV.1
First, we present the following lemma to show that the
general models have the same properties as the multinomial
and Gaussian uncertain models presented in [30], [32]
Lemma A.1. Let Assumption 4-6 hold. Then, the uncertain
likelihood update for each hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ and each agent












Proof. The first condition when |r𝑖𝜃| < ∞ is easily obtained


























according to Proposition III.1 property (a). Similarly, the
second condition is trivially obtained due to property (b) of
Proposition III.1.
Next, we include the following lemmas to help prove
Theorem IV.1. Finally, we include the following two lemmas.
Lemma A.2 (Lemma 5 in [14]). For a stationary doubly








where ‖ · ‖ is the spectral norm, 𝜆 = 1 − 𝜂4𝑚2 , and 𝜂 is a
positive constant s.t. if [A]𝑖𝑗 > 0, then [A]𝑖𝑗 > 𝜂.
Lemma A.3 (Lemma 3.1 in [47]). Let {𝛾𝑘} be a scalar







Proof of Theorem IV.1. We start by taking the standard 2-
norm between the log-beliefs and the log-average asymptotic




















































where I is the identity matrix and ℓ𝜃(𝜏) =
[ℓ1𝜃(𝜔
1





′. The first inequality follows since
the norm of (1 − (1/𝑚))I is less than 1, while the the final
inequality is achieved using Lemma A.2. Furthermore, since






𝜆𝑡−𝜏 ‖log (ℓ𝜃(𝜏))‖ = 0
in probability from Lemma A.3. Finally, since 𝜆 < 1




𝜆𝑡 ‖log (ℓ𝜃(0))‖ = 0 in probability.
Then, by the continuity of the logarithmic function, this







in probability and the desired result is achieved, where ⊘
indicates the Hadamard division.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM IV.2
Next, we prove Theorem IV.2 where |r𝑖𝜃| → ∞ ∀𝑖 ∈ ℳ.
First, we present the following corollary and lemmas that
show that the general uncertain models are consistent with
multinomial and Gaussian uncertain models presented in [30],
[32].
Corollary B.0.1. Let Assumptions 4-6 hold and agent 𝑖 is
certain for every hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ*𝑖 , i.e., |r𝑖𝜃| → ∞. Then,
the uncertain likelihood update ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔
𝑖
𝑡) converges in probability
to 1 as 𝑡→ ∞.
Lemma B.1. Let Assumptions 4-6 hold and the agent 𝑖 is
certain about a hypothesis 𝜃 ∈ Θ, i.e., |r𝑖𝜃| → ∞. Then, the
expected value of the log-uncertain likelihood update has the
following properties,











in probability, where ̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1) =∫︀
Φ𝑖
𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜑
𝑖)𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1))𝑑𝜑 is the denominator of
the uncertain likelihood update (12), and
lim
𝑡→∞














Proof. First, using condition (b) of Proposition III.1, as |r𝑖𝜃| →








𝜃)̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1) . (44)









After adding and subtracting 𝑄𝑖(𝜔) log(𝑄𝑖(𝜔)) inside the
integral, we achieve
E𝑄𝑖 [log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔))] = 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄𝑖‖ ̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1))−
𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄
𝑖‖𝑃 𝑖(𝜔|𝜑𝑖𝜃))).
Then, from condition (a) of Proposition III.1, our desired result
is achieved since ̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1) converges in probability to
𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃*) as 𝑡→ ∞.
Lemma B.1 indicates that as time 𝑡 becomes very large, the
accumulation of likelihood updates log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔)) can be approx-
imated as exp(𝑡(𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄𝑖‖𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃*)−𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄𝑖‖𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑
𝑖
𝜃))+
𝜖)) for some 𝜖 > 0, where 𝜖 → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞. This




then the beliefs will decrease exponentially based on the KL
divergence.
Next, we provide the final property of the uncertain likeli-
hood update that is necessary to prove our main result.
Lemma B.2. Let Assumptions 4 and 6 hold. Then, the uncer-
tain likelihood update is finite and strictly positive value with




Proof. First, consider the condition when |r𝑖𝜃| < ∞ and
𝑡 <∞. Then, under the regularity conditions, the prior 𝑓0(𝜑𝑖)
has full support over the parameter space Φ𝑖 and the posterior
distributions 𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓({𝜔1:𝑡−1, r𝜃})) and 𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1))
have not converged to a delta function. Given that the
support of the likelihood and the prior are consistent
as stated in Assumption 4, the support of the posteriors
𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓({𝜔1:𝑡−1, r𝜃})) and 𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡)) remain intact and
the posterior predictive distributions ̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|{𝜔1:𝑡−1, r𝜃}) =∫︀
Φ
𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜑
𝑖)𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓({𝜔1:𝑡−1, r𝜃}))𝑑𝜑𝑖 and̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1) = ∫︀Φ 𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜑𝑖)𝑓(𝜑𝑖|𝜓(𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1))𝑑𝜑𝑖 are
finite and nonzero. Thus, 0 < ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔
𝑖
𝑡) <∞ for all 𝜃 ∈ Θ.
When the number of observation grows unboundedly and
there is a finite amount of prior evidence, i.e., 𝑡 → ∞





𝑡) = 1 according to Lemma A.1. Furthermore,
when the agent 𝑖 becomes certain and the number of observa-
tions is finite, i.e., |r𝑖𝜃| → ∞ and 𝑡 <∞, the uncertain likeli-





𝜃)/ ̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1). As stated
above, the posterior predictive distribution ̂︀𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖1:𝑡−1) is
finite and non zero and 𝑃 𝑖(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜑
𝑖
𝜃) is finite and non zero
according to Assumption 4. Thus, combining the above three
conditions indicates that 0 < ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔
𝑖
𝑡) <∞.
Now we can prove Theorem IV.2.
Proof of Theorem IV.2. First, suppose that agent 𝑖 has col-
lected an infinite amount of evidence for a hypothesis 𝜃. Then,
from Lemma III.1 condition 2, the numerator of the uncertain
likelihood update (12) converges in probability to 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃) as
|r𝑖𝜃| → ∞. When 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃) = 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃*), the result is trivially
achieved following the proof of Theorem IV.1 above since
ℓ𝑖𝜃(·)
𝑝→ 1 in probability and 0 < ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔𝑖𝑡) < ∞ for all 𝑡
and 𝑖 ∈ ℳ according to Corollary B.0.1 and Lemma B.2
respectively.
Next, suppose that 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃) ̸= 𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃*). Then, if we divide












where 𝜇0(𝜃) = 1 as stated at the beginning of Section IV.




















The first term on the right-hand side of the preceding equation



















where 𝐶1 = max𝜏=1,...,𝑇 ;𝑖∈ℳ log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔𝑖𝜏 )) < ∞ by
Lemma B.2, and ‖A‖2 6 1 since A is doubly stochastic
according to Assumption 2. Thus, for any finite 𝑇 , the limit of
the first term on the right-hand side of (45) deterministically







A𝑡−𝜏 log(ℓ𝜃(𝜏)) = 0. (47)




















where 𝐶2 = max𝜏=𝑡−𝑇+1,...,𝑡;𝑖∈ℳ log(ℓ𝑖𝜃(𝜔𝑖𝜏 )) < ∞ by
Lemma B.2. Thus, the limit of the above deterministically








Next, we consider the second term on the right-hand side
of (45). First, we define the following quantities








where ℒ𝜃𝜃* = P𝜃 ⊘ P𝜃* is the likelihood ratio
of P𝜃 = [𝑃 1(·|𝜑1(𝜃)), ..., 𝑃𝑚(·|𝜑𝑚(𝜃))]′ and P𝜃* =
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[𝑃 1(·|𝜑1(𝜃*)), ..., 𝑃𝑚(·|𝜑𝑚(𝜃*))]′; and ⊘ is the Hadamard















































where the upper bound is achieved by expanding the second
line and taking the spectral norm of the second third and fourth
terms and applying Lemma A.2.
Then, we can take the limit of (51) as 𝑡 → ∞. Since
lim𝑡→∞ 𝑒
𝑖
ℓ(𝑡) = 0 in probability for all 𝑖 ∈ ℳ according
to Lemma A.1 and 0 < 𝜆 < 1, it follows from Lemma A.3
that the first term on the right-hand side of (51) converges to
zero.
Then, let 𝜖 > 0 be arbitrary. Since lim𝑡→∞ 𝑒𝑖ℓ(𝑡) = 0 ∀𝑖 ∈
ℳ, there exists a time 𝑇 s.t. for all 𝑡 > 𝑇 , eℓ(𝑡) 6 𝜖1. Thus,















Additionally, 𝑇 is chosen sufficiently large s.t. 𝜆𝑇 6 𝜖






















































































by the strong law of large numbers; and Ω+ = {𝜔 ∈
Ω|𝑃 𝑖(𝜔|𝜑𝑖𝜃) > 𝑃 𝑖(𝜔|𝜑𝑖𝜃*)} and Ω− = {𝜔 ∈ Ω|𝑃 𝑖(𝜔|𝜑𝑖𝜃) <
𝑃 𝑖(𝜔|𝜑𝑖𝜃*)} are the sets of observations s.t. the log-likelihood
ratio log(𝑃 𝑖(𝜔|𝜑𝑖𝜃)/𝑃 𝑖(𝜔|𝜑𝑖𝜃*)) is positive or negative respec-
tively. Then, by Assumption 4 and since the probability of
agent 𝑖 drawing an 𝜔 ∈ Ω s.t. 𝑄𝑖(𝜔) = 0 is zero, the constant
𝐶3 is finite for any 𝑚 < ∞. Thus, the third term on the
right-hand side of (51) is finite.
The final term on the right-hand side of (51) simply con-






















































































Since, 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄𝑖‖𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃)) > 𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄𝑖‖𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃*)) for at least
one agent 𝑖 with parameters for hypothesis 𝜃 𝜑𝑖𝜃 ̸= 𝜑𝑖𝜃* .
Therefore, we can select a finite time 𝑇 such that 𝜖 is
arbitrarily small and (1/𝑚)
∑︀𝑚
𝑖=1𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄




𝑖‖𝑃 𝑖(·|𝜑𝑖𝜃*)). This causes the
log-beliefs to diverge in probability to log(𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃)) → −∞ for
all 𝑖 ∈ ℳ. Then, by the continuity of the exponential function,
the beliefs converge in probability to lim𝑡→∞ 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝜃) = 0 for
all 𝑖 ∈ ℳ.
APPENDIX C
REGULARITY CONDITIONS
Assumption 7 (Regularity Conditions [39], [40]). We assume
the following regularity conditions for the likelihood functions
𝑃 (·|𝜑) and the prior distribution 𝑓0(𝜑).
(a) The set of possible parameters Φ is defined on a compact
set.
(b) If 𝜑1 and 𝜑2 are two distinct points in Φ, then the
distributions 𝑃 (·|𝜑1) and 𝑃 (·|𝜑2) are different.
(c) The parameters {𝜑𝜃|𝜃 ∈ Θ} lie within Φ.
(d) The prior distribution 𝑓0(𝜑) is continuous everywhere
and nonzero for all {𝜑𝜃|𝜃 ∈ Θ}, i.e., 𝑓0(𝜑𝜃) > 0.
(e) The ground truth parameter 𝜑𝜃* uniquely minimizes the
KL divergence, 𝜑𝜃* = argmin𝜑𝐷𝐾𝐿(𝑄‖𝑃 (·|𝜑)).
(f) The log-likelihood log(𝑃 (·|𝜑)) is twice differentiable with
respect to 𝜑 in the neighborhood of 𝜑𝜃* and 𝜑𝜃.
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(g) The Fisher information matrices 𝐽(𝜑𝜃*) and 𝐽(𝜑𝜃) of the
log-likelihood log(𝑃 (·|𝜑)) evaluated at 𝜑𝜃* and 𝜑𝜃 are
strictly positive and bounded.
For a detailed list and discussion of the regularity conditions,
please see [39] for well-specified likelihood models and [40]
when the likelihood models are misspecified.
